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Bringing Sexy Back: Unauthorized 
Film Editing, Copyright, and 
How Removing Reproductive Acts 
Violates Reproduction Rights 
Logan Clare∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
In the late 1990s,1 Ray Lines, along with his wife Sharon, 
endeavored to mine a previously untapped market by creating 
clean, edited versions of major Hollywood films and turning them 
into E-Films.2  The process was simple: take a hit film, delete 
objectionable and indecent content, including bad language, 
nudity, and graphic violence so that conservative audiences could 
enjoy mainstream entertainment free of salacious situations.3  The 
 
∗ J.D. Candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 2008; J.D. Candidate, Fordham 
University School of Law, 2008; B.A. Art History, Barnard College, 2003.  I would like 
to thank Professor Joel Reidenberg for his inspiration and advice, and the members of the 
Fordham Intellectual Property, Media & Entertainment Law Journal for their help in 
completing this Comment.  I would also like to thank Mike for every single thing, and my 
parents for all their love and support. 
 1 See Andrew Gumbel, Censored in the Name of the Lord, INDEP. (London), Sept. 21, 
2005. 
 2 See Clean Flicks of Colo., LLC v. Soderbergh, 433 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1238 (D. Colo. 
2006).  Mr. Lines has stated: “I enjoy movies but I got tired of sitting in theaters saying, 
if only they had left that one scene out.” Kieth Merrill, Cleaning Up the Movies (pt. 1), 
MERIDIAN MAG., http://www.meridianmagazine.com/arts/020604clean.html (last visited 
Jan. 27, 2007).  E-films are simply “cleaned up versions of box-office hits.” Rick Lyman, 
Hollywood Balks at High-Tech Sanitizers; Some Video Customers Want Tamer Films, 
and Entrepreneurs Rush to Comply, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2002, at E1. 
 3 The first foray into this business was the creation of a sanitized version of TITANIC 
for Lines’ Mormon neighbors. Gumbel, supra note 1. 
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idea was a popular one, and a number of businesses began to offer 
similar products.4  The Lines themselves profited by launching 
CleanFlicks,5 a franchised chain of video rental stores that 
exclusively offered E-Films.6 
Robert Huntsman, an attorney who owned several CleanFlicks 
stores in Colorado and Idaho,7 was so certain that producing and 
selling these E-Films fell within the limits of the law that he sought 
a declaratory judgment holding that the creation and sale of E-
Films did not constitute a violation of the exclusive rights 
conferred by the Federal Copyright Act of 19768 upon the 
copyright owners of the original films.9  Unfortunately for 
Huntsman, the District Court for the District of Colorado ruled that 
all businesses that created and/or marketed such altered movies 
operated in direct violation of the Copyright Act.10  The court’s 
decision forced Huntsman, Lines, and many other purveyors of E-
Films out of business, and enjoined all these merchants from 
engaging in such proscribed activity in the future.11 
The court held that producers and vendors of E-Films, which it 
collectively referred to as “Mechanical Editing Parties,”12 violated 
two of the exclusive rights Section 106 of the Copyright Act 
provided to copyright holders: the right to reproduce a copyrighted 
 
 4 “Both the numbers of such companies and their reach have expanded in just the last 
few months.” Lyman, supra note 2. 
 5 The Lines’ enterprise was called  CleanFlicks Media, Inc. See 
http://www.cleanflicks.com (last visited Feb. 11, 2007).  However, CleanFlicks appears 
as two words in the federal reporter. See Clean Flicks, 433 F. Supp. 2d 1236.  I have 
chosen to refer to the enterprise as ‘CleanFlicks,’ except when making a direct citation to 
the case name as reported. 
 6 See id.; Joanne Ostrow, Sanitizing Films: Directors vs. Censors, DENVER POST, Apr. 
21, 2005, at F1 (“In an interview, Clean Flicks [sic] owner Ray Lines says his business 
was born when several friends asked him to edit Kate Winslet’s nude scene out of their 
DVD copies of Titanic.  Suddenly, he found himself in the movie business.”). 
 7 John Accola, A Win for Movie Sanitizers: Judge Drops Two Companies from 
Copyright Lawsuit, ROCKY MTN. NEWS (Denver), Aug. 19, 2005, at 2B. 
 8 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–810 (2000). 
 9 See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000) (affording lawful copyright holders certain exclusive 
rights); Accola, supra note 7. 
 10 Clean Flicks of Colo., LLC v. Soderbergh, 433 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1243–44 (D. Colo. 
2006). 
 11 Id. 
 12 Id. at 1237. 
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work and the right to distribute a copyrighted work publicly.13  
Even though the discretionary editing led to the creation of new 
works that are fundamentally different in nature and character from 
the original films, the court nevertheless determined that the E-
Films were not “transformative”14 and thus did not constitute 
derivative works based on the original copyrighted work.15  
Though the Mechanical Editing Parties asserted defenses premised 
on both fair use and the first sale doctrine,16 the court astutely 
rejected both of these lines of reasoning,17 neither of which was 
applicable to the actions of the Mechanical Editing Parties. 
Part I of this Comment outlines the relevant case law and 
doctrine, including the various provisions of the Copyright Act of 
1976,18 as well as the case law that defines and demarcates 
copyright infringement and the boundaries of fair use.  Part II 
examines the Clean Flicks decision and the court’s reasoning 
behind its finding of copyright infringement.  Part III argues that 
the court’s holding was flawed because the secondary works 
CleanFlicks created constitute derivative works, and analyzes the 
court’s erroneous application of the fair use test.  Part IV concludes 
that robust enforcement of valid copyrights in artistic works is 
particularly important in a society that does not recognize the 
doctrine of moral rights in justifying copyright protection. 
 
 13 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1), (3) (2000); Clean Flicks, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1243. 
 14 Clean Flicks, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1241. 
 15 Id. at 1242. 
 16 Id. at 1239, 1242.  Section 109 of the Copyright Act codifies the first sale doctrine, 
essentially removing the copyright holder’s right of control over an authorized work once 
that work enters into the stream of commerce. See 17 U.S.C. § 109 (2000); Quality King 
Distrib., Inc. v. L’Anza Research Int’l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135, 152 (1998).  The first sale 
doctrine does not operate to relinquish the copyright holder’s control of the copyright 
itself. See Mirage Editions, Inc. v. Albuquerque A.R.T. Co., 856 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 
1988) (holding that the first sale doctrine does not relinquish a copyright holder’s 
exclusive right to prepare derivative works). 
 17 Clean Flicks, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1242. 
 18 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–810 (2000). 
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I. RELEVANT CASE LAW AND DOCTRINE 
A. Copyright Infringement, 17 U.S.C. § 106 
Section 106 of the federal Copyright Act of 1976 grants owners 
of copyrighted works certain exclusive rights, and precludes others 
from engaging in specific activities without express authorization 
from the copyright owner.19  The statute reads, in pertinent part: 
“the owner of copyright . . . has the exclusive rights . . . (1) to 
reproduce the copyrighted work . . . ; (2) to prepare derivative 
works based upon the copyrighted work; [and] (3) to distribute 
copies . . . of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other 
transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending.”20  In the 
absence of express authorization, if a plaintiff can prove valid 
ownership of a copyright, and that the putative defendant copied, 
in any form enumerated in § 106, original elements of the work to 
which this copyright applies, courts will deem the defendant an 
infringer.21  Courts often rely on circumstantial evidence to prove 
copying,22 but many cases involve direct appropriation of a 
copyrighted work.23 
 
 19 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000). 
 20 Id. 
 21 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991) (citing Harper & 
Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 548 (1985)).  The Court in Feist 
traced the originality requirement from its inception in The Trade-Mark Cases through to 
cases decided after the Copyright Act of 1976 became law. Id. at 345–58.  In order to 
qualify for copyright protection, works of independent creation must contain a “modicum 
of creativity,” id. at 346 (citing The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879), as 
copyright law does not reward merely the “sweat of the brow,” id. at 359–60.  For a good 
discussion of the elements of direct copyright infringement, see Melanie Costantino, 
Note, Fairly Used: Why Google’s Book Project Should Prevail under the Fair Use 
Defense, 17 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 235, 247–50 (2006). 
 22 Courts will look to see if there has been access and if the works are substantially 
similar.  See Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946).  Substantial similarity 
is not the same as probative similarity, which looks to the amount of copied material; 
substantial similarity instead focuses on the quality of the copied material and how 
integral to the original work it is. See generally Johnson v. Gordon, 409 F.3d 12, 18 (1st 
Cir. 2005). 
 23 Compare Clean Flicks of Colo., LLC v. Soderbergh, 433 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1243 (D. 
Colo. 2006) (holding that the use of whole copyrighted films in creating edited versions 
of those films is direct infringement), with Bright Tunes Music Corp. v. Harrisongs 
Music, Ltd., 420 F. Supp. 177, 180–81 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (holding that George Harrison’s 
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B. The Doctrine of Fair Use, 17 U.S.C. § 107 
The affirmative defense of fair use, while long-standing, 
existed as an exclusively judge-made doctrine until its codification 
in § 107 of the Copyright Act of 1976.24  A determination of fair 
use essentially excuses an allegedly infringing work from liability 
for infringement, as its benefit to the progress in the sciences and 
arts outweighs the detriment its existence causes.25  Under the 
statute, courts weigh the following four factors when making 
determinations of whether the secondary use is fair: 
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether 
such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit 
educational purposes; 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in 
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and 
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or 
value of the copyrighted work.26 
If the balance of the four factors weighs in favor of the 
secondary work as opposed to the original, copyrighted work, the 
secondary work meets the statutory threshold, and judges will 
 
song “My Sweet Lord” misappropriated the chord progressions of another hit song, 
Robert Mack’s “He’s So Fine”), aff’d, 772 F.2d 988 (2d Cir. 1983). 
 24 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 576 (1994).  Justice Story 
articulated the governing formulation for determining whether an infringer was making 
“fair use” of a copyrighted work in 1841: “look to the nature and objects of the selections 
made, the quantity and value of the materials used, and the degree in which the use may 
prejudice the sale, or diminish the profits, or supersede the objects, of the original work.” 
Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (No. 4901) (D. Mass. 1841).  In Campbell, Justice 
Souter traces Congress’ intent in drafting of Section 107 of the Copyright Act of 1976, 
which transformed the judge-made doctrine of fair use into statutory law through 
codification.  Campbell, 510 U.S. at 576–78. 
 25 See Bill Graham Archives v. Doring Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 608 (2d Cir. 
2006) (citing Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Group, 150 F.3d 132, 141 (2d Cir. 
1998)). 
 26 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000). 
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sanction the continued manufacture of the secondary work without 
liability.27 
In Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, the Supreme Court considered the 
doctrine of fair use in the context of parodies.28  Campbell 
involved the rap group 2 Live Crew’s parodic use of Roy 
Orbison’s classic song, “Oh, Pretty Woman,” the copyright to 
which Acuff-Rose held.29  The 2 Live Crew version of the song 
utilized the same basic structure and many of the same lyrics, but 
also offered what the Court saw as “a comment on the naiveté of 
the original of an earlier day . . . a rejection of its sentiment that 
ignores the ugliness of street life and the debasement that it 
signifies.”30  The Court noted that both the first factor, the 
“purpose and character of the use” factor, and the second factor, 
the “nature of the copyrighted work,” weighed in favor of Acuff-
Rose, as the 2 Live Crew song was purely commercial in nature 
and Orbison’s original creative expression fell at the heart of what 
copyright seeks to protect.31 
The third factor, which explores “the amount and substantiality 
of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a 
whole,”32 weighed in favor of neither the parodists nor the 
copyright holders.33  The Court acknowledged that the parodists 
took a substantial amount of the original work, but recognized that 
parody requires a “recognizable allusion” to an original work.34  
The Court relied most heavily, however, on the fourth statutory 
factor, the “effect of the use upon the potential market for or value 
of the copyrighted work,”35 and remanded the case for a 
 
 27 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578; see also Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207 (1990) 
(“‘[C]ourts [should] avoid rigid application of the copyright statute when, on occasion, it 
would stifle the very creativity which that law is designed to foster.’” (quoting Iowa State 
Univ. Research Found., Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 621 F.2d 57, 60 (2d Cir. 1980))). 
 28 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 571–72. 
 29 Id. at 572–73. 
 30 Id. at 583. 
 31 Id. at 578–86. 
 32 17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (2000). 
 33 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 589.  The Court remanded the case to determine, in light of 2 
Live Crew’s parodic purpose, whether 2 Live Crew took more than was necessary. Id. 
 34 Id. at 587–88. 
 35 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2000). 
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determination of the economic impact on the potential “rap music” 
market for derivative works based on Orbison’s song.36 
The Court determined that although a parody might be 
commercial in nature, might infringe on creative expression, such 
as a song, that is “closer to the core of intended copyright 
protection than other [works],”37 and might make use of a 
substantial portion of the copyrighted work, as long as the use is 
clearly parodic, an infringing party is justified in making such “fair 
use” of the original copyrighted work.38  The lesson learned from 
Campbell is that while fair use might be defensible given the 
societal value of a secondary work, the secondary work’s existence 
might nevertheless cause irreparable harm to the potential market 
for the original.39 
The fair use defense applies to all putative violations of § 106 
of the Copyright Act,40 but is more difficult to apply to derivative 
works,41 given the Constitutional interest in the progress of the arts 
and sciences.42  A derivative work, as defined in § 101 of the 
 
 36 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 593–94.  The Court noted that “2 Live Crew’s song 
comprises not only parody but also rap music, and the derivative market for rap music is 
a proper focus of enquiry.” Id. at 592–93 (citing Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation 
Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 568 (1985). 
 37 Id. at 586. 
 38 See id. at 594 (“The [C]ourt [of Appeals] erred in holding that 2 Live Crew had 
necessarily copied excessively from the Orbison original, considering the parodic 
purpose of the use.”). 
 39 See Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Group, 150 F. 3d 132, 145 (2d Cir. 
1998) (“[T]he fair use, being transformative, might well harm, or even destroy, the 
market for the original.”). 
 40 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000). 
 41 See, e.g., Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1362–63 (Ct. Cl. 
1973), aff’d by an equally divided court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975).  Although it was not 
necessarily easy for the court to determine that the use of photocopied, copyrighted 
materials by government officials was fair, the balance was limited to rights holders’ 
interests in copyright protection versus society’s interest in the advancement of medical 
science. Id. at 1359.  With a case involving straight reproduction, a court is not even 
forced to comment on the quality or worth of either the original or the infringing works 
themselves.  In Campbell, the Court specifically notes that while it “might not assign a 
high rank to the parodic element” of 2 Live Crew’s derivative work, it was still parodic in 
nature and ultimately excused by a fair use defense. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 583.  See also 
Clean Flicks of Colo., LLC v. Soderbergh, 433 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1240 (D. Colo. 2006) 
(“This [c]ourt is not free to determine the social value of copyrighted works.”). 
 42 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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Copyright Act, is “a work based upon one or more preexisting 
works, such as a . . . motion picture version” and is, in and of itself, 
a new original work of authorship.43  Courts have interpreted this 
exception as requiring that a new derivative work be 
“transformative” of the copyrighted work,44 in order to truly  
demonstrate progress.45  In general, however, “no part of an 
infringing derivative work should be granted copyright 
protection.”46 
C. The ‘First Sale’ Doctrine 
CleanFlicks and other Mechanical Editing Parties relied on the 
“first sale doctrine” as an additional affirmative defense.47  The 
first sale doctrine “protects the purchaser in any use of the 
authorized copy acquired but does not permit the making of 
additional copies.”48  The doctrine, codified in § 109 of the 
Copyright Act, stands for the proposition that a copyright holder 
cannot control the use or disposition of individual copies once 
those individual copies have been sold.49  In Mirage Editions, Inc. 
v. Albuquerque A.R.T. Co., the Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit held that the first sale doctrine did not protect transfer of art 
from the pages of a book onto ceramic tiles, as this transfer 
constituted preparation of a derivative work.50  The court held that 
“the right to transfer applies only to the particular copy of the book 
which . . . has [been] purchased and . . . does not transfer [the] 
 
 43 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).  “A work consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, 
elaborations, or other modifications which, as a whole, represent an original work of 
authorship, is a derivative work.” Id. 
 44 See Clean Flicks, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1241 (“This raises the question of whether these 
DVD-Rs are ‘transformative.’”). 
 45 See Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 608 (2d Cir. 
2006) (citing Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 
1111 (1990)); see also Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 (“[T]he goal of copyright, to promote 
science and the arts, is generally furthered by the creation of transformative works.”). 
 46 Anderson v. Stallone, No. 87-0592 WDKGX, 1989 WL 206431, at *10 (C.D. Cal. 
Apr. 25, 1989). 
 47 Clean Flicks, 443 F. Supp. 2d at 1242. 
 48 Id. 
 49 See C.M. Paula Co. v. Logan, 355 F. Supp. 189, 191–92 (N.D. Tex. 1973) (quoting 1 
MELVILLE B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 103.3 (1972 ed.). 
 50 856 F.2d 1341, 1344 (9th Cir. 1988). 
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right [to prepare derivative works].”51  The owner of a purchased 
book does not control the copyright to that book, but the copyright 
holder may not control how an individual copy of that book is 
used, so long as the owner does not exercise any of the exclusive 
rights delineated in § 106.52 
II. THE CLEAN FLICKS DECISION 
A. Background 
The dispute started in 2002, when Robert Huntsman filed a 
declaratory judgment against 16 members of the Directors Guild of 
America (“DGA”),53 including Steven Soderbergh, Martin 
Scorsese and Steven Spielberg,54 as a “preemptive strike.”55  
Huntsman filed on behalf of businesses that produced E-Films for 
family viewing, wherein editing companies, at their sole discretion, 
removed “objectionable” language and images from movies 
through certain technological means56 and then distributed these 
 
 51 Id. 
 52 Id.; see also H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 79 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
5659, 5693 (“[T]he outright sale of an authorized copy of a book frees it from any 
copyright control over its resale price or other conditions of its future disposition.”). 
 53 “[T]hrough the collective voice of more than 12,700 members that the DGA 
represents, the Guild seeks to protect directorial teams’ legal and artistic rights, contend 
for their creative freedom, and strengthen their ability to develop meaningful and credible 
careers.” Michael Apted, DGA President, Welcome to the Directors Guild of America 
Web Site, http://www.dga.org/index2.php3?chg= (last visited Jan. 27, 2007). 
 54 Second Amended Complaint and Jury Demand at 1–2, Clean Flicks of Colo., LLC v. 
Soderbergh, 433 F. Supp. 2d 1236 (D. Colo. 2006) (No. 02-M-1662 (MJW)), 2002 WL 
32153735, at *1. 
 55 See Sara Gansheimer, Comment, The Family Entertainment and Copyright Act and 
Its Consequences and Implications for the Movie-Editing Industry, 8 TUL. J. TECH. & 
INTELL. PROP. 173, 179 (2006); see also Nicole Griffin Farrell, Frankly, We Do Give 
a . . . Darn!  Hollywood’s Battle Against Unauthorized Editing of Motion Pictures: The 
“CleanFlicks” Case, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 1041, 1043 (2003) (stating that the DGA’s 
publication of a memorandum on its website revealing its intent to file suit against 
CleanFlicks and the other creators and purveyors of E-Films precipitated Huntsman’s 
preemptive strike). 
 56 Gansheimer, supra note 55, at 175–78.  The creators of E-Films employed one of 
three methods to produce their sanitized movies. Id.  Cut-and-splice editing, in which an 
editor physically or digitally cuts out objectionable portions of a film and then reattaches 
the remaining scenes, is the most straightforward of these techniques. Id. at 175–76.  
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altered copies, by rental or sale, to retailers and video rental 
outlets. 
CleanFlicks, one of the E-Films producers, operated by first 
obtaining an authorized copy of a movie, and digitally copying the 
entire movie onto the hard drive of a computer, circumventing 
protective safeguards encoded onto the DVD to prevent such 
copying.57  Next, CleanFlicks digitally edited the movie, creating a 
new fixed work.58  CleanFlicks redacted objectionable audio and 
visual content through the use of ambient noise,59 black bars to 
cover any indecencies, fogging, cropping, and “blending” of 
existing content.60  CleanFlicks copied the newly edited version 
onto a blank DVD-R or VHS cassette, and placed its trademarked 
logo onto the case before shipping the work out for public 
consumption.61 
In response to the declaratory judgment, the directors 
counterclaimed against Huntsman and filed a motion seeking leave 
to compel joinder of several major movie studios (“the Studios”), 
as the film studios, not the directors, are the rightful owners of the 
copyrights in question.62  Without the Studios, the directors lacked 
the requisite standing to assert counterclaims of copyright 
 
CleanFlicks and CleanFilms favored the digital incarnation of this method, which entails 
loading a DVD onto a computer, removing objectionable scenes with the aid of digital 
editing software, and then burning the sanitized version onto a new DVD or VHS. Id. at 
176.  The second method is filtering, wherein one encodes a DVD or VHS cassette with 
an instruction for a DVD player or VCR directing the player to cut out or mute a section 
of the film during playback. Id. at 177.  ClearPlay is a well-known purveyor of DVD 
players with built-in technology allowing subscribers to go online and order filtering 
instructions for a given film through ClearPlay’s proprietary subscription service. Id.  The 
third method is filtering-plus technology, in which editors digitally superimpose new 
material—such as a corset over Kate Winslet’s originally bare breast in Titanic—in order 
to sanitize objectionable scenes. Id. 
 57 Clean Flicks, 443 F. Supp. 2d at 1238. 
 58 Id. 
 59 In a scene that takes place on a city street, for example, the editors at CleanFlicks 
might have used the sound of a car horn to cover up an uttered expletive. 
 60 Clean Flicks, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1238. 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. (“The Studios, in the aggregate, have valid copyrights for the motion pictures . . . 
identified by name in the filed papers and, therefore, have the exclusive rights grated by 
§ 106 of the [Copyright] Act.”); see also Farrell, supra note 55, at 1043–44. 
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infringement.63  The directors also moved to join 13 other parties,64 
and the DGA filed a motion for leave to intervene.65  The court 
granted all these motions on October 15, 2002,66 while the Studios 
lodged their counterclaim on December 13, 2002.67  The 
Mechanical Editing Parties relied on the doctrines of fair use and 
“first sale” to defend their alleged infringement upon the Studios’ 
copyrights.68 
In 2005, before any decision regarding the legality of 
CleanFlicks’ activities, Congress, as a component of the Family 
Entertainment and Copyright Act of 2005,69 enacted the Family 
Movie Act of 2005, which sanctions the use of filtering technology 
for in-home family viewing.70  The Family Movie Act creates an 
exemption for skipping audio-visual content of a motion picture so 
long as “no fixed copy of the altered version of the motion picture 
is created by [a] computer program or other technology.”71  The 
 
 63 Farrell, supra note 55, at 1045 (“Regardless of the particular editing methodologies, 
the original plaintiffs may not have had standing if the motion-picture studios had not 
been joined as necessary parties.”). 
 64 Id. at 1043–44 (citing Defendants’ Motion to Compel Joinder of Third-Party 
Copyright Holders as Necessary Parties at 2, Clean Flicks, 433 F. Supp. 2d 1236 (No. 02-
M-1662 (MJW))). 
 65 Id. at 1044 (citing Defendants’ Motion for Leave to Join Third Parties as 
Counterdefendants at 1–2, Clean Flicks, 433 F. Supp. 2d 1236 (No. 02-M-1662 (MJW)); 
Amended Counterclaim at 6–9, Clean Flicks, 433 F. Supp. 2d 1236 (No. 02-M-1662 
(MJW)); DGA’s Motion for Leave to Intervene at 3, Clean Flicks, 433 F. Supp. 2d 1236 
(No. 02-M-1662 (MJW))). 
 66 Id. (citing Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Compel Joinder of Third-Party 
Copyright Holders as Necessary Parties at 1, Clean Flicks, 433 F. Supp. 2d 1236 (No. 02-
M-1662 (MJW)); Order Granting Defendant’s Motion for Leave to Join Third Parties as 
Counterdefendants at 1, Clean Flicks, 433 F. Supp. 2d 1236 (No. 02-M-1662 (MJW)); 
Order Granting DGA’s Motion for Leave to Intervene at 1, Clean Flicks, 433 F. Supp. 2d 
1236 (No. 02-M-1662 (MJW))). 
 67 Motion Picture Studio Defendants’ Answer and Counterclaims at 1, Clean Flicks, 
433 F. Supp. 2d 1236 (No. 02-M-1662 (MJW)), 2002 WL 32153736, at *1. 
 68 Clean Flicks, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1239, 1242; Farrell, supra note 55, at 1065. 
 69 Family Entertainment and Copyright Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-9, 119 Stat. 218 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.A., 15 U.S.C.A., 17 U.S.C.A., 18 
U.S.C.A., 28 U.S.C.A. and 36 U.S.C.A. (West 2007)). 
 70 Family Movie Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-9, sec. 201–202, §§ 110, 1114, 119 Stat. 
218, 223–24 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A. § 1114 and 17 U.S.C.A. § 110 (West 
2007)). 
 71 Id. at sec. 202, § 110, 119 Stat. at 223 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C.A. § 110 
(West 2007)). 
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court removed the parties that only provided enabling filtering 
technology, namely ClearPlay and Family Shield, from the suit 
consequent to the passage of this Act.72  Those entities that 
engaged in cut-and-splice editing, and the retailers that sold or 
rented films edited in such a manner directly to the public, 
however, remained subject to the outcome of the litigation.73 
The remaining parties in the directors’ counterclaim included 
CleanFlicks, Family Flix, Play It Clean Video, and CleanFilms.74  
Family Flix operated in much the same way as CleanFlicks, by 
copying an authorized version of a movie onto a computer, and 
subsequently editing the film to “delete ‘profanity, nudity, strong 
graphic violence and sexual content or innuendos.’”75  Family Flix 
sold the new version of the movie, along with its disabled original 
version, in the original packaging with the Family Flix 
trademark.76 
CleanFilms and Play It Clean rented and sold the films 
obtained from CleanFlicks and Family Flix directly to the public.77  
While CleanFilms maintained a one-to-one ratio of unedited to 
edited versions of the films it sold or rented, Play It Clean never 
maintained such an inventory, and relied on its suppliers’ promises 
that for every edited version sold to them, their suppliers had 
purchased an unedited version.78 
In July 2006, the court ruled on the Studios’ motion for partial 
summary judgment against the collective Mechanical Editing 
Parties.79  The Studios sought to enjoin all four of these entities 
from editing or distributing edited versions of their copyrighted 
works violative of § 106 of the Federal Copyright Act of 1976.80  
The Studios asserted that CleanFlicks and Family Flix violated 
 
 72 Huntsman v. Soderbergh, No. Civ.A02CV01662RPMMJW, 2005 WL 1993421, at 
*2 (D. Colo. Aug 17, 2005); Gansheimer, supra note 55, at 179–80. 
 73 Gansheimer, supra note 55, at 179. 
 74 Id. 
 75 Clean Flicks of Colo., LLC v. Soderbergh, 433 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1238 (D. Colo. 
2006). 
 76 Id. 
 77 Id. at 1238–39. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. at 1237. 
 80 Id. at 1238. 
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their exclusive rights to reproduce their copyrighted works,81 make 
derivative works82 based on their copyrighted films,83 and 
distribute copies of their copyrighted films.84 
B. The Court’s Holding 
In July, 2006, the United States District Court for the District 
of Colorado, with Senior District Judge Richard Matsch presiding, 
put an end to the three-year battle.85  The court ultimately ruled 
that the Mechanical Editing Parties stood in violation of two 
provisions of § 106 of the Federal Copyright Act of 1976,86 and 
that injunctive relief was the proper remedy for their infractions.87  
The court agreed with the Studios that the Mechanical Editing 
Parties violated § 106(1) of the Copyright Act when they created 
fixed copies of the Studios’ copyrighted works.88  Additionally, the 
court held that the Mechanical Editing Parties were liable for 
copyright infringement based on their “undisputed . . . 
distribut[ion], by sale and rental, [of] copies (albeit edited) of the 
Studios’ copyrighted works . . . .”89  The court, however, did not 
find that the Mechanical Editing Parties infringed on the Studios’ 
rights under § 106(2),90 namely, the exclusive right to create 
derivative works.91  The court also held that the affirmative 
defenses of fair use and the first sale doctrine that the Mechanical 
Editing Parties raised were not persuasive.92  Ultimately, the court 
 
 81 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (2000). 
 82 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2000). 
 83 Clean Flicks, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1239. 
 84 Id. (citing 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (2000)). 
 85 Amelia Nielson-Stowell, CleanFlicks Plans to Appeal Ruling, DESERET MORNING 
NEWS (Salt Lake City), July 9, 2006, at A1. 
 86 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000); Clean Flicks, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1243. 
 87 Clean Flicks, 433 F. Supp. 2d. at 1243–44. 
 88 Id. at 1239 (“The reproduction complained of is the making of . . . copies of copies, 
for which their ‘one-to-one ratio’ of edited to original version argument does not preclude 
a finding of infringement.”). 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. at 1242 (“[B]ecause the infringing copies of these movies are not used in a 
transformative manner, they are not derivative works and do not violate § 106(2).”). 
 91 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2000). 
 92 Clean Flicks, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1242. The court summarily dismissed the first sale 
doctrine defense as having no relevance to the case based on the Studios’ assertions. Id. 
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ruled that it could not deny the copyright holders’ legal right to 
control the reproduction and distribution of their protected works, 
even if its decision effectively eviscerated the Mechanical Editing 
Parties’ businesses.93 
C. Court Denies CleanFlicks’s Fair Use Defense 
Once it determined that the newly edited works infringed upon 
only two of the exclusive rights § 106 affords to lawful copyright 
holders, the court turned its attention to an analysis of whether fair 
use was a viable defense to all allegations of infringement.94  In so 
doing, the court concluded that the edited versions of the 
copyrighted works were not transformative, and therefore not 
derivative works as defined by § 101 of the Copyright Act.95  The 
court reasoned that because the Mechanical Editing Parties 
“add[ed] nothing new to these movies,” but rather only “delete[ed] 
scenes and dialogue from them,” they did not violate § 106(2) of 
the Copyright Act.96  This determination in turn led to the court’s 
conclusion that fair use was not a viable defense in the case at 
hand.97 
The court conducted a factor-by-factor analysis of the fair use 
defense, starting with the first factor, which contemplates the 
purpose and character of a use.98  The court noted that the basis for 
the Mechanical Editing Parties’ assertion of fair use is criticism,99 
an example of fair use that the statutory codification specifically 
enumerates.100  The Mechanical Editing Parties relied on Chicago 
 
at 1242. The court also rejected the affirmative defenses of waiver, estoppel and laches as 
the facts of the case did not support these defenses. Id. 
 93 Id. at 1243. 
 94 Id. at 1239. 
 95 Id. at 1239–41. 
 96 Id. at 1241. 
 97 Id. (citing Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994)). 
 98 Id. at 1240. 
 99 Id. 
 100 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000) (listing “criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching 
(including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research” as activities that 
are non-infringing).  Note that Congress did not intend this to be a closed list. Campbell, 
510 U.S. at 577 (“The text employs the terms ‘including’ and ‘such as’ in the preamble 
paragraph to indicate the ‘illustrative and not limitative’ function of the examples 
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Board of Educ. v. Substance, Inc.101 to support their contention that 
criticism of the Studios’ films supported a claim of fair use.102  The 
court, in response, pointed out the irony of citing a case that 
specifically noted that indiscriminate publishing for the purpose of 
criticism was just as inexcusable as the destruction of fine art by an 
unappreciative viewer.103  The court concluded that it was not free 
to evaluate the social worth of the Studios’ copyrighted works.104  
Therefore, the court held that the defendants’ reliance on 
Substance was inapposite, and the Mechanical Editing Parties 
could not cloak their behavior under the veil of criticism.105 
With respect to the second fair use factor, the court stated that 
because the secondary works were not transformative, the purpose 
and character of use factor did not support the Mechanical Editing 
Parties’ fair use defense.106  Certain courts and commentators have 
asserted that this second factor is the most important in a 
determination of fair use,107 so it would seem that the fair use 
defense would likely fail if the secondary work was not 
transformative,108 particularly since a transformative work is more 
likely to further the progress of the arts and sciences contemplated 
by the Copyright Clause.109  The court further determined that 
 
given.”) (citing Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 561 
(1985)). 
 101 354 F.3d 624 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that a teacher is entitled to criticize questions 
contained in standardized tests, even if that criticism might require substantial quotation). 
 102 Clean Flicks, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1240. 
 103 Substance, 354 F.3d at 630 (“[The teacher] does not have the right . . . to destroy the 
tests by publishing them indiscriminately, any more than a person who dislikes 
Michelangelo’s statue of David has a right to take a sledgehammer to it.”).  Judge Posner 
also notes that “[i]t is not a privilege to criticize just bad works, and there is no right to 
copy copyrighted works promiscuously merely upon a showing that they are bad.” Id. 
 104 Clean Flicks, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1240. 
 105 Id. 
 106 Id. at 1241 (“There is nothing transformative about the edited copies.”). 
 107 See Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 608 (2d Cir. 
2006) (citing Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 
1111 (1990)). 
 108 See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
 109 Additionally, the more transformative the secondary use, the less likely it is that the 
new work serves as a substitute for the original. See Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol 
Publ’g Group, 150 F.3d 132, 145 (2d Cir. 1998); see also Campbell v. Acuff Rose Music, 
Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 591 (1994) (noting that when a secondary work is transformative, 
“market substitution is at least less certain, and market harm may not be so readily 
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consideration of the third factor, “the quantitative and qualitative 
nature of the copyrighted material taken,” weighed heavily against 
a determination of fair use, because the Mechanical Editing Parties 
copied the original works in near entirety with no 
transformation.110 
The court devoted most of its discussion to the fourth statutory 
factor, which focuses on the potential economic harm that a 
secondary work might inflict on the owner of the copyrighted work 
with respect to both the original work and any potential derivative 
works.111  This third factor is widely considered the most important 
in a fair use analysis.112  The Mechanical Editing Parties asserted 
that in creating their clean versions, they were expanding the 
market for the Studios’ films to include consumers who would 
otherwise not view the films because of the indecencies contained 
therein.113  The Court noted that while this argument contained 
“superficial appeal,”114 it was fundamentally misguided.115  
According to the court: “the intrinsic value of the right to control 
the content of the copyrighted work . . . is the essence of the law of 
copyright.”116  Consequently, the court determined that the right to 
exclude certain audiences from reach was a right held exclusively 
by the Studios.117 
After rejecting the Mechanical Editing Parties’ affirmative 
defenses, the court held that the Studios deserved the requested 
 
inferred”); Costantino, supra note 21, at 269 (“The more the allegedly infringing work is 
transformed from the original, the less the commercialism prong of the section 107(1) test 
will matter.”) (citing Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 818 (9th Cir. 2003)). 
 110 Clean Flicks, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1241.  The court explains that the second factor 
weighs heavily in favor of the Studios based on the non-transformative nature of the 
secondary works coupled with the creative expression of the copyrighted films 
themselves. Id.  The third factor, the amount used, also weighs heavily in favor of the 
Studios based on the pilfering of the films in their entirety. Id. 
 111 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).  See also Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590; Harper & Row, 
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 568 (1985). 
 112 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 574 (citing Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 566); Costantino, 
supra note 21, at 257. 
 113 Clean Flicks, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1241–42. 
 114 Id. at 1242. 
 115 Id. 
 116 Id. 
 117 Id. 
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injunctive relief.118  In response to the requested injunction, the 
Mechanical Editing Parties retorted that such an equitable remedy 
would effectively “destroy their businesses and deprive the public 
of the benefit of seeing these movies without offending their 
sensibilities to the deleted material.”119  The Mechanical Editing 
Parties relied on the Court of Claims’ decision in Williams & 
Wilkins Co. v. United States.120  That case involved the 
unauthorized photocopying of materials by government employees 
in their efforts to further medical science and research.121  The 
Court of Claims held that the detriment it would inflict upon 
society if it enjoined such activity outweighed the harm the 
copyright owners encountered to such an extent that the 
photocopying constituted fair use.122  The court in Clean Flicks, 
however, distinguished the entertainment value of films from the 
societal value of the advancement of medical science and, finding 
no equation, determined that the public interest in providing 
injunctive relief for the Studios was sound.123 
D. The Court Denies the ‘First Sale’ Defense 
The court properly determined that the first sale doctrine was 
of no relevance to the case at bar.124  As Judge Matsch noted, while 
the first sale doctrine protects an owner’s use of an authorized 
version of a copyrighted work, it does not allow the purchaser to 
make additional copies of the copyrighted work.125  The Studios, 
however, were not complaining about the use of the lawfully 
acquired copies of their films; they were seeking to enjoin the 
Mechanical Editing Parties from using a lawfully acquired copy in 
“making edits and creating the copies that are distributed to the 
 
 118 Id. at 1238.  The Copyright Act allows for reasonable temporary or permanent 
injunctive relief. 17 U.S.C. § 502 (2000). 
 119 Clean Flicks, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1242. 
 120 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), aff’d by an equally divided court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975). 
 121 Id. at 1346–47. 
 122 See Clean Flicks, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1243 (outlining the factual distinction between 
the case at bar and the Williams & Wilkins case). 
 123 Id. (referring to the Mechanical Editing Parties business as “illegitimate”).  The court 
further ordered the Mechanical Editing Parties to turn over their entire inventories of any 
infringing works to the Studios. Id. at 1244. 
 124 Id. at 1242. 
 125 Id. 
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public.”126  Therefore, the first sale doctrine did not excuse the 
infringing behavior.127 
III. WHY THE COURT ERRED IN ITS RULING 
The court correctly determined that the Mechanical Editing 
Parties infringed the exclusive right of a copyright holder to 
reproduce the work in copies.  Section 106(1) of the Copyright Act 
of 1976 establishes a straightforward exclusive right; the only 
requirements for infringement are a valid copyright, that the 
copyrighted work is reproduced in whole or substantial part, that 
the expression and not the underlying ideas are copied, and that the 
copy itself be fixed, that is, sufficiently stable to be perceived.128  
In the instant case, the Mechanical Editing Parties had reproduced 
copyrighted works in whole and created fixed, edited master copies 
in order to provide consumers with additional copies of their edited 
films.129  The court was unmoved by the Mechanical Editing 
Parties’ insistence that their method of purchasing one authorized 
film for every edited version they sold legitimized their practice, 
and correctly ruled that the Mechanical Editing Parties had 
violated § 106(1).130 
Likewise, the court was correct in holding that the Mechanical 
Editing Parties violated § 106(3), or the exclusive right to 
distribute a copyrighted work publicly.  The court pronounced that 
it was “undisputed” that the Mechanical Editing Parties were 
engaging in the distribution or public sale of edited copies of the 
copyrighted works.131  Absent a valid defense, the Mechanical 
Editing Parties violated this exclusive right of the copyright 
holders.132  The only possible defense to the exclusive right of 
 
 126 Id. 
 127 Id. 
 128 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 61 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 
5674–75. 
 129 Clean Flicks, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1239 (“The reproduction complained of is the 
making by Clean Flicks and Family Flix of voluminous fixed copies of the edited master 
versions of the Studios’ movies, i.e., copies of copies.”). 
 130 Id. 
 131 Id. 
 132 Id. 
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distribution is the first sale doctrine, codified in § 109 of the 
Copyright Act.133  A copyright holder cannot maintain control over 
each physical copy of a copyrighted work once it has sold such a 
work, which enables, for example, the resale of used music 
compact discs.134  If however the first sale doctrine is inapplicable, 
as it is in this case, no justification for engaging in such behavior 
exists.135  Accordingly, the court ruled that the Mechanical Editing 
Parties violated the Studios’ right to exclusive distribution.136 
The court erred in holding that the secondary works the 
Mechanical Editing Parties produced were not derivative.  In its 
decision, the court relied on Campbell, stating that the “Supreme 
Court said that a use is transformative if it ‘adds something new, 
with a further purpose or different character, altering the first with 
new expression, meaning or message.’”137  Yet the Mechanical 
Editing Parties did just that in their creation of their secondary 
works.138  Through altering the content of the films to appeal to a 
different audience than the filmmakers and studios originally 
intended to reach, the Mechanical Editing Parties created new 
works of authorship that embody wholly different meanings and 
contain wholly different messages.139  By their own admission, the 
 
 133 See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 62, as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5676 
(“As section 109 [of the Copyright Act] makes clear . . . the copyright owner’s rights [to 
exclusive public distribution] under section 106(3) cease with respect to a particular 
copy . . . once he has parted with ownership of it.”). 
 134 See, e.g., U2 Home Entm’t, Inc. v. Lai Ying Music and Video Trading, Inc., No. 04 
Civ.1233(DLC), 2005 WL 1231645, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. May 29, 2005). 
 135 Id. (“Th[e] right of an acquirer to resell copies is limited, however, to his possession 
of authorized copies. . . . [T]he owner of copies of a work may resell or otherwise dispose 
of those copies without seeking permission from the copyright owner only so long as the 
copies were ‘lawfully made . . . .’”). 
 136 “Read literally, § 109(a) unambiguously states that such an owner ‘is entitled, 
without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell’ that item.” Quality King 
Distributors, Inc. v. L’Anza Research Int’l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135, 145 (1998). 
 137 Clean Flicks, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1241 (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 
510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994)). 
 138 See Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 143 (2d Cir. 
1998) (“A secondary work need not necessarily transform the original work’s expression 
to have a transformative purpose.” (citing 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, 
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05[D][2] (1997 ed.))). 
 139 Taken to its logical extreme, sanctioning this type of behavior could have severely 
detrimental effects.  If the court deemed the Mechanical Editing Parties’ actions 
permissible, for example, the Mechanical Editing Parties “could create and sell versions 
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Mechanical Editing Parties were seeking to “send a strong message 
that many people object to the type of movies being created by the 
Studios.”140  It is therefore erroneous to conclude that these 
secondary works were not transformative. 
Furthermore, the secondary works satisfy the statutory 
definition of a derivative work.141  Section 101 of the federal 
Copyright Act states that a work is derivative if it consists of 
“editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other 
modifications which, as a whole, represent an original work of 
authorship.”142  In Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone 
Service Co., the Supreme Court imposed a low threshold for 
originality, requiring only that a work be “independently created 
by the author (as opposed to copied from other works), and that it 
possess[] at least some minimal degree of creativity” in order to be 
original.143  Even if one construes the Mechanical Editing Parties’ 
actions as nothing more than cut-and-splice editing, the 
Mechanical Editing Parties still engaged in discretionary editorial 
revisions and created new works of authorship.144  The secondary 
works they produced are therefore derivative. 
 
of the Studios’ Motion Pictures that removed characters of certain ethnic types or of a 
certain race because some consumers preferred their films that way.” Motion Picture 
Studios’ Reply Brief in Further Support of Their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
Against the Mechanical Editing Parties at 4, Clean Flicks, 433 F. Supp. 2d 1236 (No. 02-
M-1662 (MJW), 2002 CO App. Ct. Motions LEXIS 46, at *12. 
 140 Counterclaim Defendant CleanFlicks LLC’s Opposition to the Motion Picture 
Studios’ Opening Brief in Support of Their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
Against the Mechanical Editing Parties at 8, Clean Flicks, 433 F. Supp. 2d 1236 (No. 02-
M-1662 (MJW), 2005 CO App. Ct. Motions LEXIS 19680, at *12 [hereinafter 
CleanFlicks Opposition to Motion].  Certainly a stronger message could be sent by not 
purchasing the offensive films at all. 
 141 See, e.g., Mirage Editions, Inc. v. Albuquerque A.R.T. Co., 856 F.2d 1341, 1343 (9th 
Cir. 1988) (“The protection of derivative rights extends beyond mere protection against 
unauthorized copying to include the right to make other version of, perform, or exhibit 
the work.” (citing Lone Ranger Television v. Program Radio Corp., 740 F.2d 718, 722 
(9th Cir. 1984); Russell v. Price, 612 F.2d 1123, 1128 n.16 (9th Cir. 1979))). 
 142 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000). 
 143 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) (citing 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER 
ON COPYRIGHT § 2.01[A]–[B] (1990 ed.)). 
 144 The Mechanical Editing Parties certainly engage in discretionary editing, removing 
the parts of films that they find offensive or indecent.  See also Mirage Editions, 856 F.2d 
at 1344 (holding that the transfer of pages of an art book onto ceramic tiles was the 
creation of a new work of authorship). 
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The failure of the fair use defense in the instant case thus 
hinges on the transformative nature of the Mechanical Editing 
Parties’ works, rather than on their pilfering of substantial portions 
of the original work, or on the fact that the works they altered lay 
at the heart of that which copyright seeks to protect.  The fair use 
defense fails here primarily because the resultant economic harm 
to the potential market for this kind of derivative work is 
substantial.145  In MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, the Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit used a sliding scale approach to determine whether 
use is truly fair in the face of such potential economic harm.146  
The court stated that “the less adverse effect that an alleged 
infringing use has on the copyright owner’s expectation of gain, 
the less public benefit need be shown to justify the use.”147  In the 
instant case, the effect on the potential market for such derivative 
works was substantial; the Mechanical Editing Parties were 
essentially foreclosing the Studios from selling edited versions of 
their own films to a large audience in which little notable 
competition existed.148  It is only necessary to inquire into 
potential economic harm,149 so the fact that the Studios did not 
demonstrate an interest in appealing to such an audience is not 
dispositive.150 
 
 145 Gansheimer, supra note 55, at 185 (“The studios could lose out on profits for selling 
the more expensive . . . edited versions of their movies.”); see also Sega Enters. v. 
MAPHIA, 948 F. Supp. 923, 935 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (noting that the fourth statutory factor 
is the most important). 
 146 677 F.2d 180, 183 (2d Cir. 1981). 
 147 Id. 
 148 Gansheimer, supra note 55, at 185; accord Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g 
Group, Inc., 955 F. Supp. 260, 272 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (“It would . . . not serve the ends of 
the Copyright Act—i.e., to advance the arts—if artists were denied their monopoly over 
derivative versions of their creative works merely because they made the artistic decision 
not to saturate those markets with variations of their original.”), quoted with approval in 
Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Group, 150 F.3d 132, 146 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 149 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994) (“The fourth fair 
use factor . . . . requires courts to consider not only the extent of the market harm caused 
by the particular actions of the alleged infringer, but also ‘whether unrestricted and 
widespread conduct of the sort engaged in by the defendant . . . would result in a 
substantially adverse impact on the potential market’ for the original.” (quoting 3 
MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05[A][4] (1993 
ed.)) (emphasis added)). 
 150 But see id. at 592 (“The market for potential derivative uses includes only those that 
creators of original works would in general develop or license others to develop.”).  The 
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The Mechanical Editing Parties, moreover, did not seek to 
supersede the Studios’ films.151  As they stated in their response to 
the Studios’ motion for summary judgment, the Mechanical 
Editing parties provide “an alternate viewing experience” which 
both criticizes the Studios’ films and provides a transformation “in 
both character and purpose from their original version.”152  By 
creating these transformative, derivative works, the Mechanical 
Editing Parties sought to capitalize on an untapped market for such 
clean versions, thus violating both the letter and the spirit of the 
law.153 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The decision delivered by the United States District Court for 
the District of Colorado in the Clean Flicks case is a milestone in 
the history of copyright protection.  More and more, with the rise 
of digital capabilities,154 courts must be responsible for protecting 
the exclusive rights held by copyright owners.  Without strict 
enforcement of the statutory protections the Copyright Act offers, 
advancements in technological capability will swallow all the 
rights valid copyright owners hold. Accordingly, the court’s 
decision to enjoin the Mechanical Editing Parties’ actions was both 
correct and judicious, although its determination that the secondary 
works the Mechanical Editing Parties created were not derivative 
 
mere fact that the Studios have not yet licensed such edited versions of their works does 
not mean that it is beyond the realm of possibility that they might. Take for example the 
edited versions the Studios produce for in-flight entertainment on major airlines. 
 151 The Mechanical Editing Parties, by their own admission, create edited works, the 
“transformative impact” of which is that the “entire character of a film is changed from 
one that is unacceptable to many viewers to one those same viewers are more than 
willing to share with their families.” Counterclaim Defendant CleanFilm Inc.’s Response 
Brief to Defendant Motion Picture Studios’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 1, 
Clean Flicks of Colo., LLC v. Soderbergh, 433 F. Supp. 2d 1236 (D. Colo. 2006) (No. 
02-M-1662 (MJW), 2005 CO App. Ct. Motions LEXIS 45, at *9. 
 152 Id. at 6, 2005 CO App. Ct. Motions LEXIS 45, at *16. 
 153 See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
 154 When coupled with a concomitant rise in so-called “family values,” individuals and 
entities can harness these technological advancements to further the dangerous goals of 
censorship. 
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was doctrinally unsound and inconsistent with the goals of federal 
copyright protection. 
In the absence of moral rights protections for artists in the 
United States,155 it is crucial that judges and legislators provide the 
utmost protection against copyright infringement, particularly that 
which seeks to alter—and in so doing make more “palatable” to 
“decent” members of society—the nature of a creative expression 
and profit from that alteration.  The court did not consider a First 
Amendment justification for the actions of the Mechanical Editing 
Parties, and for good reason: it is not appropriate to impose one’s 
own tastes and preferences upon a legally protected work.156  The 
issue in the Clean Flicks case was, at its core, one of taking 
creative expression and turning it into a profitable enterprise at the 
expense of artistic vision.  The court acted appropriately in 
enjoining the illegitimate activity. 
Judge Matsch was wise to steer clear of passing judgment on 
the artistic merits of the copyrighted works.  To quote Justice 
Holmes, “it would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained 
only to the law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of 
[a work], outside the narrowest and most obvious limits.”157  While 
some people may not like what Hollywood has to say, they do not 
have the option of censorship, even in the name of criticism.  It is 
simply not legally cognizable to invoke the protection of our 
children from the indecencies of society,158 as depicted in 
Hollywood movies, as a justification for reaping economic gain off 
of those same reviled films.  There is no inherent right to the 
enjoyment of censored versions of artistic expression, and if the 
artist himself does not want to compromise his vision, copyright 
law should vigorously support him. 
 
 155 See Gilliam v. Am. Broad. Cos., 538 F.2d 14, 25–26 (2d Cir. 1976) (“American 
copyright law, as presently written, does not recognize moral rights or provide a cause of 
action for their violation, since the law seeks to vindicate the economic, rather than the 
personal, rights of authors.”). 
 156 See infra note 157 and accompanying text. 
 157 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 582 (1994) (quoting Bleistein v. 
Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903)). 
 158 CleanFlicks Opposition to Motion, supra note 140, at 7–8, 2005 CO App. Ct. 
Motions LEXIS 19680, at *12 (noting that a major policy issue is the concern for our 
children and the effects of their seeing violence in films). 
